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Introduction 
 
Nuclear facilities at the end of their lives cannot simply be shut down and left 
unattended. A decommissioning process is necessary for the partial or complete 
removal of radioactive waste, using decontamination and dismantling techniques.  
Brazil and China represent, respectively, 2.9% and 3.6% of the nuclear share 
of electricity generation worldwide1, and nuclear generation expansion is part of both 
countries’ long-term energy plans. Sooner or later, Brazil and China will need to deal 
with the decommissioning of power reactors reaching the final stage of their lifecycle 
and the new installations’ decommissioning plans, pressuring the prompt assessment 
of local regulations and practices.  
Over the last decades, the law and regulation of nuclear power plant 
decommissioning is developing worldwide at a fast pace. Influenced by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) decommissioning safety standards, 
advanced jurisdictions such as the UK, US and Japan have made substantial progress 
in the elaboration of their national frameworks2.  
Conversely, the emerging economies of Brazil and China have only recently 
started to discuss their own nuclear facilities’ decommissioning framework. Looking 
at the current stage of these latecomers’ framework through the legal prism of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 IAEA, ‘Power Reactor Information System – PRIS’, 2016 < https://www.iaea.org/pris/> accessed 2 December 2017.	  
2 Kirsten Jenkins, DarrenMcCauley, Raphael Heffron, HannesStephan, and Robert Rehner, ‘Energy Justice: A Conceptual 
Review’ (2016) 11 Energy Research & Social Science, 174-182. 
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advanced jurisdictions governments’ regulations and strategies allows envisaging the 
paths to follow.  
This paper aims at assessing the Brazilian and Chinese efforts, achievements 
and challenges in the establishment of national decommissioning legal regimes using 
the analytical lenses developed by probing into the strengths exhibited by selected 
advanced jurisdictions’ decommissioning regulations and experiences, in namely the 
UK, US and Japan. 
The first part examines the decommissioning regulations and experiences of 
the UK, US and Japan, extracting the four elements of: solid legal frameworks, 
including institutional competencies; nuclear waste management and the environment; 
public engagement; and technological innovation. These four elements form a 
structural perspective that can be applied to earlier stages nuclear decommissioning 
frameworks to pinpoint their level of effectiveness.  
The second and third parts present the case studies of Brazil and China’s 
nuclear decommissioning regulations, respectively. The forth part encloses the 
discussion as posited within the above framework consisting of four elements, which 
will capture the key drivers for the regulatory development in the emerging 
economies of Brazil and China.  	  
1. Advanced nuclear decommissioning frameworks and experiences 
 
1.1. International  
 
Under the auspices of the IAEA, States operating nuclear energy power plants 
have adopted the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 
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on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management3 establishing obligations to ensure 
the waste management safety resulting from the closure (Article 17) and 
decommissioning (Article 26).  
Moreover, for the last 30 years the IAEA4 has played a significant role in the 
development of international decommissioning safety standards for regulators, 
operators and stakeholder 5 . The 2016 ‘Governmental, Legal and Regulatory 
Framework for Safety General Safety Requirements’ recognizes as essential elements 
of the governmental policy the creation of provisions facilitating ‘the 
decommissioning of facilities and the safe management and disposal of radioactive 
waste’ (Requirement 10). Although non-legally binding instruments, the IAEA safety 
standards possess persuasive esteem, overtly influencing many national regulators in 
designing their own frameworks. 
According to the IAEA, decommissioning is a process that aims at placing the 
closed facility in such a condition that it poses no unacceptable risk to the public, the 
workers, and the environment6. The IAEA offers a divisional definition and tripartite 
categorization of alternative decommissioning strategies7, in order of preference8: (i) 
immediate dismantling, in which the radioactive material can be removed shortly after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Entered into force in 2001. 
4 Others international organizations, such as the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Western European Nuclear Regulator’s 
Association and the WANO - World Association of Nuclear Operators are also involved with the technological research and 
regulatory aspects of the decommissioning of nuclear power plants within their scope of works. 
5 The IAEA Safety Guides collection about decommissioning of nuclear power plants includes: (i) 2017 Safety of Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Facilities – Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-4; (ii) 2014 Decommissioning of Facilities Series No. GSR Part 6, 
Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors Safety Guide No. WS-G-2.1; and (ii) 1999 Decommissioning 
of facilities using radioactive Material No. WS-R-5. 
6 IAEA, Safety Reports Series No. 50 – Decommissioning Strategies for facilities using radioactive material (IAEA, 2007), para. 
2.1. 
7 ibid para. 2.2-2.4. 
8 Michele Laraia, Advances and Innovations in Nuclear Decommissioning (Woodhead Publishing, 2017) 28. 
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the end of operations; (ii) deferred dismantling, in which the facility is placed in a 
safety area for a period before dismantling, to allow the reduction of the radioactive 
elements to acceptable levels; and (iii) entombment, in which the radioactive material 
is encased in a long-lasting structure, equivalent to a waste disposal site, 
recommended for exceptional circumstances such as after a severe accident9.  
The IAEA safety standards recognize the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(‘EIA’) as a procedure that permits public participation and the assessment of 
measures to reduce the radiation exposure to humans and the environment within the 
radius or risk10 . According to the IAEA Decommissioning and Environmental 
Remediation Programme, technological innovations can play a significant part to 
safely clean-up nuclear sites, such as the use of robotics to control remotely the 
decontamination process and to handle the plants components11. 
The IAEA promotes assistance for the States’ plans and implementations of 
the decommissioning safety guides and encourages co-operation amongst them for the 
exchange of technical information, knowledge and experiences, including a network 
for the interactions of decommissioning activities professionals12.  
 
1.2. US  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ibid 28. 
10 IAEA, Managing Environmental Impact Assessment for Construction and Operation in New Nuclear Power Programmes 
(IAEA, 2014). 
11 IAEA, Decommissioning and Environmental Remediation, IAEA Bulletin (April 2016) 22-23.  	  
12 IAEA International Decommissioning Network – IDN < https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/connect/IDNpublic/Pages/default.aspx> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
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The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is an independent regulator 
tasked with protecting public health and safety regarding nuclear energy13. The NRC 
sets out the fundamental requirements for nuclear power plant decommissioning in a 
range of regulations14, revised in August 1996 to reflect the experience obtained 
during actual decommissioning activities. 
In the 1990s, several nuclear power plants completed decommissioning 
without a viable option for disposing of their spent nuclear fuel, because of the lack of 
a geologic repository’s definition by the federal government.  
The NRC requires early notification of planned decommissioning activities 
and forbid major decommissioning activities prior to the provision of certain 
information to the NRC and the public.	  
In the US, the public has several opportunities to participate in the 
decommissioning process: (i) after the submittal of a post-shutdown decommissioning 
activities report to the NRC; (ii) when NRC receives the license termination plan; and 
(iii) prior to the issuance of a license amendment approving the plan. In addition, 
when NRC holds a meeting with the licensee, members of the public may observe the 
meeting, except when confidential information is involved15.  
 The long-standing trend of the US leadership on nuclear R&D has been declining 
lately 16 , culminating with the 2017 bankruptcy filling of the local company 
Westinghouse, for many decades the world's leading supplier of safe and innovative 
nuclear technology, which included nuclear decommissioning services.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, About NRC <https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html> accessed 22 December 2017.  
14 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20 Subpart E, and Parts 50.75, 50.82, 51.53, and 51.95. 
15 Luther J. Carter, Nuclear imperatives and public trust: Dealing with radioactive waste (Routledge, 2015). 	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1.3. UK 
 
The first nuclear reactor in the UK was built in the 1950s. A growing number 
of nuclear power plants have therefore reached the end of their life cycles.  
In 2005, the UK government established an independent authority – the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) – to implement clean up and 
decommissioning processes of nuclear reactors17. According to the 2004 Energy Act, 
the NDA will not perform the decommissioning and remediation tasks itself but it has 
the rights to outsource the work by contracts and oversees the British Energy’s 
planning and budgets for decommissioning. 
Accordingly, the UK’s four major principles of decommissioning are: (i) to 
ensure the continuous safety of the citizens, workers and the environment; (ii) to 
minimize the negative environmental impacts; (iii) to release and regenerate land for 
future proper other use; and (iv) to minimize the financial costs18. Aligned with these 
principles, the 1999 Nuclear Reactors (Environmental Impact Assessment of 
Decommissioning) Regulations, as amended, require the assessment of the potential 
environmental impact of projects to decommission nuclear facilities before consent is 
given. 
To deal with the complex case of the Sellafield site, the NDA has been 
encouraging technological inovations in the nuclear decommissioning sector, such as 
lasers19 and robots20 to reduce risks for workers. Opened in 1947 as a pioneer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Institution of Engineering and Technology, Legal framework for the nuclear industry in Great Britain (the IET, 2017). 
18 The Institution of Engineering and Technology, Nuclear Decommissioning (the IET, 2008). 
19  Laraia (n 10) 238. 
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commercial nuclear power station, Sellafield is the largest nuclear site in Europe, with 
over 1,000 nuclear facilities that have accumulated tonnes of radioactive waste.  
One of the distinguishing features of the UK’s whole framework is that it 
highly values public engagement for the decommissioning processes and the wider 
nuclear sector21. In 2013, the policy statement ‘The UK’s Nuclear Future’ highlighted 
the importance of t public engagement and awareness, which was later reaffirmed “In 
the Public Eye” report, containing recommendations of related actions. In fact, the 
UK nuclear sector has made significant progress in engaging with the public. This 
trend has been described as motion “from the control by an elite group of technical 
experts to a more deliberative and transparent approach”. For example, the nuclear 
waste management institutions have become aware that mere technical expertise is 
not sufficient to justify their solutions to the wider public and to implement the plans 
successfully22.  
Also, the UK has a strong framework, industries and technologies for nuclear 
waste management, as demonstrated by the 2014 “Implementing Geological Disposal” 
and by the 2015 follow-up public consultation of UK’s National Programme for the 
Responsible and Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. Once more, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ‘UK funding for innovative solutions’, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1859865292?accountid=9851> 
accessed 17 January 2018. 
21 International Atomic Energy Agency, An overview of stakeholder involvement in decommissioning (IEA 2016). See also 
National Nuclear Laboratory, ‘Public Engagement in the Nuclear Sector: A UK and EU perspective’ (2016) EU08051/06/10/01 
Issue 3. 
22 This approach is also evidenced by recent amendments to the UK planning and infrastructure law, in which the Secretary of 
State has more power for decision-making when considering the public engagement. 
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the public plays a critical role in planning and formulating the long-term solutions for 
UK’s radioactive waste23. 	  
 
1.4. Japan 
 
Japan has very few natural energy resources hence, nuclear power is 
considered fundamental for its energy security. The first commercial nuclear power 
plant was established in 1966. At present, there are 51 nuclear power units with a total 
installed capacity of 44,917 MW, ranking Japan within the  top three nations in the 
world in terms of installed capacity whilst generating around 30% of Japan’s 
electricity supply24. 
The Japanese legal frameworks for regulating nuclear power sectors comprise 
three major pieces of legislation, namely the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955, the 
Law for Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel and Reactors of 1957, 
and the Law Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes etc. 
of 1957. There are also other regulations and administrative directives derived from 
the Atomic Energy Basic Law25.  
Democracy, independence, and public disclosure form the three fundamental 
pillars and principles clearly addressed by the Japanese Atomic Energy Basic Law 
(Article 2). Article 4 of the Basic Law sets up the basic institutional architecture for 
regulating nuclear power in Japan. Under this design, the Atomic Energy Commission 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Raphael Heffron, Nuclear Waste Management, the Yearbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2016) 212-214. 
24 Reference documents for IRRS Japan 2016. 
25 Yoshio Baba, ‘The Problems Facing Nuclear Power in Japan – Emphasizing Law and Regulations’ (2016) 69 Nuclear Law 
Bulletin  <https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlb/nlb-69/nlb69-baba.pdf> accessed 17 January 2018.  
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(AEC) and the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) in the Cabinet Office jointly ensure 
a democratic approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Japan. 
With regards the nuclear decommissioning license and related processes, the 
Reactor Regulation Act details all the requirements and items that should be included 
in a decommissioning plan. The frameworks place strong emphasis on technical 
control and constraint over nuclear material and equipment, restricting the 
transportation of nuclear fuel material and waste. Japan clearly refers to the IAEA's 
safeguard mechanisms in these matters.  
The Japanese Environmental Impact Assessment Law sets procedures 
governing environmental impact assessment on decommissioning projects, although it 
lacks guidance about the final disposal facilities26.  
The main feature of the Japanese institutional design is its independence and 
efficiency. More recently, a new Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was 
established as an independent regulatory authority, which can operate without 
external influences from the Ministry of Environment and other governmental 
agencies. The main tasks of NRA cover review and integration of the domestic 
nuclear regulations and the development of human resources in the nuclear energy 
sectors27.  
Also, Japan has a comprehensive framework for nuclear damage 
compensation28. Though Japan is not a party to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 ibid.  
27 Jun Fukasawa and Momoko Okusaki, ‘Reform of the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Bodies in Japan’ (2012) International Nuclear 
Law Association 2012 Congress, 8-11 October 2012, Manchester, England. 
28 C-S. Chen, ‘Establishment of an East Asian Nuclear Safety and Liability Regime’ (2014), International Nuclear Law 
Association 2014 Congress. 
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Liability for Nuclear Damage, the original 1961 Nuclear Damage Compensation Law 
has been revised and updated in recent years, referring to the relevant international 
standards. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japan has adopted the 
unlimited liability of the operator, and the decision that the operator cannot benefit of 
an exemption from liability for accidents caused by a grave natural disaster29. 
Regarding the application of technological advances in the nuclear 
decommissioning pratices, Japan has developed advanced robotic techniques to tackle 
remaining radioactive areas of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster30. 
 
1.5. Correlations in the advanced nuclear decommissioning approaches  
 
The selected jurisdictions of US, UK and Japan bear common policy goals for 
decommissioning practices. The regulation standards of these jurisdictions draw up 
supported by the IAEA and its efforts to promote nuclear safety. 
In a related parallel form, the US, UK and Japan decommissioning legal 
regimes focus on (i) maintaining safety throughout the entire decommissioning 
process, and (ii) minimizing environmental impacts, including the radioactive waste 
management and the requirement of the EIA. As common traits, they all have solid 
independent regulatory systems and involve civil society at the most critical stages of 
the decommissioning processes. Moreover, apart from the current circumstances 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Stephen G. Burns, ‘The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: The International Community Responds’ (2012) 11 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, 739-773. 
30 Michal, V, ‘Remote operation and robotics technologies in nuclear decommissioning projects’, Nuclear 
Decommissioning Planning, Execution and International Experience (Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy, 
2012). 
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excepting the US, the UK and the Japan are making sustained investments in the 
applications of nuclear technology in favor of the safety standards.  
The continuous development of nuclear technologies enables the reduction of 
the financial costs of decommissioning, the achievement of environmental 
sustainability, and the maintenance of nuclear safety. These are crucial factors for 
their successful experiences31.  
Based on the successful decommissioning practices above, it would be useful 
to distill the following analytical elements: (i) solid legal frameworks, including 
institutional competencies; (ii) nuclear waste management and the environment; (iii) 
public engagement; and (iv) technological innovation. Such elements form a 
structural perspective that enables the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
decommissioning framework of jurisdictions at an earlier stage. 
In the following chapters Brazil and China’s regulatory developments will be 
described and accessed based on this four-element analytical framework. Rather than 
a mere comparison of the experiences of Brazil and China with those of US, UK and 
Japan, the extensive nuclear decommission experiences of the advanced jurisdictions 
will be used as means to measure their progress.  
 
2. The decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Brazil 
 
2.1. Overview of nuclear energy in Brazil 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Although there are relevant local differences in the means and the level of the variables adopted by the US, UK and Japan, 
such analysis is outside of the scope of this work.	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Nuclear power has been produced in Brazil since the 1980s. Located at a 
coastal area of the Rio de Janeiro State, the power plant complex Central Nuclear 
Almirante Álvaro Alberto - CNAAA consists of two reactors producing energy 
contributing to the national power grid, Angra 1 and 2, and a third under construction, 
Angra 3. Angra 1 began commercial operation in 1985, with a generating capacity of 
640 MW, whilst Angra 2 has been under commercial operation since 2001, possessing 
a generating capacity of 1,350 MW. Both Angra 1 and 2 are the by-product of 
international co-operations: Angra 1 was purchased from a US company and Angra 2 
was built with German technology as part of a comprehensive nuclear agreement 
between Brazil and West Germany, signed in 197532. Angra 3’s construction works 
started in the 1980s, but they were interrupted several times due to financial and 
political issues. Its completion currently depends on partnerships with foreign 
investors for financial support. Angra 3 is expected to add 1,405 MW of power to the 
national power grid by 2026, when the reactor is projected to begin operating33.  
Nuclear power plants provide approximately 3% of Brazil’s electricity 
Nuclear energy is a component of the thermal complementary source of energy to the 
Brazilian energy matrix, which is largely based on hydroelectricity (<65%)34.  
According to the National Ten-year Plan 2026 (2017)35, Brazil’s energy 
demand is expected to grow at 1.9% per year from 2016 to 202636. Synchronously, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, ‘Specific case of large energy system impact in Brazil  risk assessment and management of nuclear 
energy’ (1984) 10 Environmental International 437.	  
33 Brazil, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética – EPE, ‘Plano Decenal de Energia - PDE 2026’ (2017) 58. 
<http://www.epe.gov.br/pde/Paginas/default.aspx> accessed 19 November 2017. 
34 The Brazilian energy matrix subsumes further thermal sources of energy including gas (10%), biomass (7.4%), coal (2.4%) and 
oil (2.2%); and non-hydro renewable such as wind (9.2%), and solar (0.1%) energy. All the data of the electric power sector 
refers to August/2017 <http://www.mme.gov.br/web/guest/secretarias/energia-eletrica/publicacoes/boletim-de-monitoramento-
do-sistema-eletrico/boletins-2017> accessed 17 December 2017 (in Portuguese):. 
13 
 
the correspondent expansion of the energy supply in its consolidatory form 
encapsulates non-fossil fueled sources, including nuclear energy. The Plan relies 
largely on Angra 3 as part of the expansion of the nuclear energy sector by 2026, 
referring vaguely to the installation of further power plants after 2026, at shorter 
intervals of 5-7 years37. Published ten years earlier, the National Energy Plan 2030 
provided a more ambitious project of four new nuclear power stations operating at a 
generating capacity of 1,000 MW each in addition to Angra 3, and the expansion of 
nuclear fuel production38. 
It is arguable that Brazil can benefit from the expansion of nuclear energy as a 
complementary source of the energy matrix39. Recent episodes of water scarcity in 
São Paulo40 demonstrate that Brazil’s hydropower overdependence on water makes it 
vulnerable to climate and rainfall change patterns, often resulting in electric power 
shortages41. Nuclear power plants could alleviate the pressures on water resources, 
without contributing to greenhouse gas emissions42. Also, in comparison to non-hydro 
renewable sources, nuclear power plants’ continuous generation of energy provide 
energy security and higher reliability to the national system against the intermittent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The National Ten Year Plan is an annual study conducted by the Energy Research Company from the Brazilian Ministry of 
Mines and Energy. 
36 EPE (n 42) 48.  
37 ibid 53.  
38 EPE is currently developing a National Energy Plan 2050. 
39 Guimarães, L S. ‘News and Views: Nuclear Power in Brazil’ (2011) 41 Braz J Phys, 107-108; Joaquim F. de Carvalho and Ildo 
L. Sauer, ‘Does Brazil need new nuclear power plants?’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 37 1580. 
40 Herton Escobar, ‘Water security. Drought triggers alarms in Brazil's biggest metropolis’ (2015) 347 (6224) Science, 812. 	  
41 Erik Eduardo Rego, Celma de Oliveira Ribeiro, Oswaldo Luiz do Valle Costa, Linda Lee Ho, ‘Thermoelectric dispatch: From 
utopian planning to reality’ (2017) 106 Energy Policy, 266-277. 
42 R. L. P. dos Santos et al., ‘The Importance of nuclear energy for the expansion of Brazil’s electricity grid’ (2013), 60 Energy 
Policy, 288. 
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contributions of solar and wind43. The advantages include the fact that the country 
could potentially reach self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy production since it has 
one of the largest reserves of uranium in the world and the technological 
competencies in the nuclear fuel cycle, from mineral prospecting to uranium 
enrichment and fuel fabrication44. 
 
2.2. Nuclear energy sector legal framework 
 
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution establishes the national legal regime for 
nuclear activities. Accordingly, the Federal Union has control over the operation of 
nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plants, and possesses monopoly command 
over surveying, milling, mining, exploiting and exploring over nuclear minerals and 
materials and the related activities of industrialization and commerce (Articles 21, 
XIII and 177, V).  
The National Policy on Nuclear Energy Act was enacted in 1962 (Law N. 
4.118 of as 27 August 1962, as amended by Law N. 6.189, of 16 December 1974, and 
Law N. 7.781 of 27 June 1989), creating the National Nuclear Energy Commission 
(Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear, CNEN) as the national nuclear regulator. 
The CNEN reports to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MTC) and its 
functions vary from assisting the formulation of the national nuclear policy and 
licensing nuclear power plants to establishing the standards and guidelines of nuclear 
activities, including radiological protection and nuclear safety, inspections, safeguards 
of nuclear materials, waste transport, disposal and safety, research and development, 
training and human resources development.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Guimarães (n 48) 107-108. 
44	  R. L. P. dos Santos et al. (n 40), 288.	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Over the years, the Brazilian nuclear regulatory system has been criticized for 
the potential conflicts of interest amongst the CNEN's attributions. The CNEN is 
responsible for formulating regulations and issuing licenses. At the same time, it is 
responsible for enforcing the law and its own regulations as an inspector of nuclear 
operations. In this context, the CNC's independence could be questioned for being an 
inspector of activities approved by its own act. Also, according to the international 
standards of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Art, 20(2))45, regulatory functions must be 
independent from other organizational measures related to spent fuel or radioactive 
waste management46.  
No nuclear power station shall be installed in Brazil without an operation 
license.47 In addition to nuclear licensing, a separate environmental license is required 
to prevent or mitigate impacts to the environment during the installation, operation or 
decommissioning of the nuclear power plant. The National Environmental Agency48 
is responsible for the licensing and EIA49. 
Although public participation is a requirement for the elaboration of rules by 
CNEN and for the EIA50, in practice there are limitations to public participation, 
which can be weak or nonexistent, predominantly because scientific language is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The Convention was signed and ratified by Brazil according to the National Decree N. 5935, of 19 December 2006. 
46 The issue was the subject-matter of the Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development of the Chamber of Deputies 
Report (2006) and a Class Action filed by the Brazilian Federal Prosecutors (2007). 	  
47 According to the Regulations CNEN-NE-1.04, of 14 December 1984 and the CNEN 15/02, of 12 December 2002. 
48 Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis, IBAMA. 
49 Resolution CONAMA (from the National Counsel of the Environment) N. 237, from 19 December 1997. 
50 Resolution CONAMA N. 001, of 23 January 1986 and Resolution CONAMA N. 237, of December 19th, 1997; and Law N. 
9,784, providing the General Regulation in Administration, of 29 January 1999 (Srticles 31 to 34). 	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accessible to the public and there is no requirement for a nontechnical summary 51 and, 
occasionally the public lack influence on actual decision making.  
Eletrobras Eletronuclear is responsible for the planning, construction and 
operation of the power plants. It is a subsidiary of the Brazilian state-owned electrical 
power company Eletrobras reporting to the Ministry of Mines and Energy.  
 
2.3. Brazilian Decommissioning Framework 
 
In April 2012, the CNEN opened for public consultation the draft regulation 
on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, from 4 April to 2 June 201252. The 
participants’ contributions were limited to the semantic aspects of the text53, whilst 
lacking in a substantive commentary of the decommissioning process, impacts and 
costs.  
Some months later, the CNEN published the Normative Order N. 133, which 
took effect on 8 November 2012 (also known as the CNEN Norm NN 9.01, 
thereinafter referred as “CNEN Decommissioning Rules”), covering the following 
topics: scope of application, responsibilities, decommissioning phases and strategies 
guidance, funding and management, expressly referencing health, safety, security and 
environmental requirements throughout.  
According to the CNEN Decommissioning Rules, the operator of the nuclear 
power plant is responsible for the planning and implementation of decommissioning, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Glasson, John and Salvador, Nemesio Neves B. ‘EIA in Brazil: a procedures-practice gap. A comparative study with reference 
to the European Union, and specially the UK’ (2000) 20 Environmental Impact Assessment Review. 
52  Consulta Pública - Projeto de Norma - NN 9.01 - Descomissionamento de Usinas Nucleoelétricas 
<http://appasp.cnen.gov.br/seguranca/normas/cp-conspub.asp?ano=2012&numero=09> accessed 17 December 2017 (in 
Portuguese). 
53 Consulta Pública - Projeto de Norma - NN 9.01 - Descomissionamento de Usinas Nucleoelétricas 
<http://appasp.cnen.gov.br/seguranca/normas/cp-analise.asp?ni=102> accessed 17 December 2017 (in Portuguese). 
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including security and protection against radiological risks (Article 4). It is possible 
for the operator to delegate specific tasks of the decommissioning process to third 
parties, but will remain responsible for the security of the plant (Article 4, paragraph 
1). The operator is also responsible for funding decommissioning and managing 
resulting radioactive waste (Article 5), and is required to carry out the environmental 
impact assessment (Article 6, V). 
The CNEN Decommissioning Rules reflect the IAEA’s menu of 
decommissioning strategies, to be elected at the operator’s discretion. As previously 
discussed, the strategies comprise immediate dismantling, deferred dismantling and 
entombment, with each option varying in the timescale required for decontamination 
or removal of contaminated assets. When opting for one of these strategies, the 
operator should consider international experiences and other relevant policies 
particular to radioactive waste management as well as the management and the 
storage of the waste resulting from the decommissioning.   
In Brazil, the waste management process is subject to specific legal 
requirements. The Brazilian Law N. 10.308 of 20 November 2001 contains the 
general rules on radioactive waste, regarding the selection of the location, 
construction, licensing, operation, monitoring, costs and civil responsibility. The 
criteria to consider for the selection of location are located in Article 5 and the 
apportionment of duties and responsibility between CNEN and the operator are also 
contained in the said legislation. This Law must be read and interpreted in conjunction 
with the CNEN specific regulation concerning waste management54, which addresses 
the technicalities of activities relating to waste such waste classification according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 CNEN Rules: NE-6.05, of 17 December 1985; NE-6.06, of 24 January 1990 and NN-6.09, of 23, September 2002. 
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the degree of contamination, and the three types of deposit for radioactive waste 
alternating in accordance with initial, intermediary or final phase. 
To date, no solution has been devised for the infallible, definite and indefinite 
disposal of radioactive waste. This is a particularly sensitive issue for Brazil due to 
the 1987 nuclear accident known as Cesium 137, when citizens came into direct 
contact with high levels of radiation stemming from an old abandoned hospital55. 
6,000 tons of radioactive waste are stored in a deposit located in the accident region. 
As for the spent nuclear fuels from the nuclear power plant in operation, they are 
temporarily deposited inside the CNAAA complex. To counter this threat, during the 
environmental licensing for Angra 3 the national environmental agency IBAMA 
required as a prerequisite to licensing the creation of a geological deposit coated in 
concrete and steel, for the storage of radioactive waste, enduring one hundred years.   
Moreover, in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, when 
many countries decided to re-examine their nuclear safety regulations56, Brazilian 
nuclear safety legislation was not particularly revised. This fact however renewed 
calls for the creation of an independent agency for nuclear power in Brazil57 and it has 
affected the public opinion in Brazil concerns about nuclear safety and waste 
disposal58.  
The CNEN Decommissioning Rules also deal with the decommissioning 
planning phases. During the nuclear licensing phase of the power plant, prior to its 
installation, the operator must present to CNEN the Preliminary Decommissioning 
Plan (Article 11) proposing the decommissioning strategy and including amongst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Robert Gale, ‘Radiation accident grips Goiania’ (1987) 238 (4830) Science, 1028-1031. 
 
56 News staff, ‘Nuclear Power's Global Fallout’ (2011) 331 (6024) Science, 1502-1503. 
57 José Goldemberg, ‘News and Views: Perspectives for Nuclear Energy in Brazil after Fukushima’, (2011), 41 Braz J Phys, 105. 
58 R. L. P. dos Santos et al. (n 40), 288. 
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other requirements, the budget and financial guarantees. Regarding the Final 
Decommissioning Plan (Article 12), it should be presented two years before the end 
of the commercial operation of the power plant, as part of the nuclear licensing 
process. The Final Decommissioning Plan should be implemented in less than 60 
years after the cessation of commercial operation and once approved, it replaces the 
Preliminary Decommissioning Plan.  
Alongside the Final Decommissioning Plan, the operator must submit to 
CNEN a specific Security Analysis comprising all the planned activities and the 
abnormal events that could occur during the decommissioning. The Security Analysis 
must contain, as one of the foundations of the Final Decommissioning Plan, an 
evaluation of the potential leakage of radioactive substances, which might adversely 
affect the public and environment. The CNEN Decommissioning Rules include a 
provision addressing the financial resources required to support decommissioning 
costs, which should be available even in the event that decommissioning occurs 
before the agreed date, due to accidents or the operator’s decision (Articles 15 and 16). 
To support the decommissioning costs of nuclear power plants in Brazil, 
Eletrobras created funds which amounted to approximately R$335Mi (US dollars) in 
2014. Resources are transferred to the funds on a yearly basis and correspond to 1.5% 
of the gross billing from selling energy as produced by Angra 1 and 2. CNEN has 
established provisions for the management of financial resources for the 
decommissioning activities, following the CNEN Order N. 9.02 (Resolution CNEN 
204/16, of 26 October 2016). 
Once the decommissioning procedure is over, the operator must submit to 
CNEN the Decommissioning Final Report, demonstrating the implementation of the 
Decommissioning Final Plan and that the final stage of the nuclear power plant was 
20 
 
achieved (Article 24). Following the approval of the Decommissioning Final Report, 
CNEN issues the Liberation of Regulatory Control (Article 28). 
For the power plants under construction or in operation, which is the case for 
Angra 1, 2 and 3, the CNEN Decommissioning Rules has established a 2 year time-
frame for the preparation of the Decommissioning Preliminary Plan.  
In practice, Brazil has never experienced the decommissioning of its nuclear 
power plants. Angra 1 and Angra 2, both possess an estimated operating life of 40 
years. Nevertheless, Angra 1 is approaching the end of its operating life and will be 
subject to closure and decommissioning in the near future. Unless an extension period 
is requested, Angra 1 will complete 40 years of commercial operation in 2025.  
As per Angra 2, it will reach the end of its operating life in 2040. Although the 
CNEN Decommissioning Rules from 2012 requires the preliminary decommissioning 
plan before the installation of the nuclear power plant, for obvious reasons these rules 
could not be applied to past events such as the installation of Angra 1 in 1985 and of 
Angra 2 in 2000. Eletrobras Eletronuclear is currently developing the preliminary 
decommissioning plan for Angra 1 and 2.  
 
3. The nuclear decommissioning framework in China  
 
3.1. China’s growing role in global nuclear industry 
 
China's nuclear power industry has seen faster growth in the past five years59. 
At present, the number of nuclear power plants in operation in China has reached 36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Huang Ge, ‘China see nuclear advances’ (2017) Global Times, <	  http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1070579.shtml> accessed 
19 January 2018. 
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facilities. China's total installed capacity of nuclear power is 56.9 million kilowatts, 
ranking it the third largest nation in the world in terms of generating capacity. Nuclear 
power reached a record high of 3.9 percent of China's total power generation in the 
first half of 201760.  
In the 2012-17 period, nuclear power projects built in China accounted for 
more than 90 percent of the world's new project construction in the nuclear sector61. 
The country aims to add more than 60 nuclear power plants to its collection in China 
by the end of 2020. According to BP’s statistics, China’s nuclear electricity 
generation will increase by 11% every year at least until 2035, and account for over 
75% of global growth in nuclear electricity generation62. Bloomberg energy finance 
also reported that China will overtake the US as the largest nuclear generator in the 
world by 202663. This speed of progression roughly equates to the building of a new 
nuclear reactor in China, every three months for the next two decades.  
The rapid growth of the nuclear industry will transform the power generation 
model in China as well as help the Chinese market reduce its dependence on coal. In 
fact, the reduction of overcapacity in the coal power sector and technological progress 
have been major driving forces in the recent and projected development of China’s 
nuclear industry. China is also strengthening efforts to develop independent 
technology through innovation, while also improving safety standards. Currently, 20 
nuclear power plants are under construction and 10 of them have adopted China-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 ‘China Focus: Domestic steam Generator headed for nuclear power plant’ (2017) Xinhua News, <	  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/17/c_136686751.htm> accessed 17 January 2018. 
61 ibid. 
62 ‘Russia completes world’s first Gen III + reactor; China to start up five reactors in 2017’ (2017) Nuclear Energy Insider <	  
https://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/russia-completes-worlds-first-gen-iii-reactor-china-start-five-reactors-2017> accessed 
17 January 2018. 
63 ibid. 
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designed third-generation nuclear power technology, namely the “third-generation” 
reactor design Hualong One steam generator64. 
Even after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, China’s energy policy for 
developing nuclear power did not change significantly65. But a weak and opaque 
governance framework has long been viewed as an obstacle. The existing legal 
framework does not adequately address the role of government, state-owned nuclear 
enterprises and the military force when it comes to the issues of waste management, 
safety and nuclear material use. 
Domestically, the first nuclear facility was built in the 1950s. Several reactors, 
including research reactor, civil and military reactor, have achieved their 
decommissioning stage 66 . Moreover, China has already contracted to construct 
nuclear power units overseas for Argentina, England, Egypt, Kenya and Romania. 
Nuclear safety has therefore become an important issue both in China’s domestic 
nuclear sector and its international operations. Plans to build dozens of new nuclear 
power plants and export China’s nuclear technologies to the rest of the world, have 
brought with them strong pressures for the Chinese government to improve its legal 
and governance regimes pertaining to the sector67.  
 
 3.2. A new regulatory reform – China’s Nuclear Safety Law of 2018 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 ‘Safe nuclear generation another hallmark of Chinese ingenuity’ (2017) China Plus, <	  
http://chinaplus.cri.cn/opinion/opedblog/23/20170925/31400.html> accessed 17 January 2018. 
65 M. V., Ramana, Amy King,  ‘A new normal? The changing future of nuclear energy in China’, Learning from Fukushima: 
Nuclear power in East Asia, (National Australian University Press, 2017), 103. 
66 Yidong Zhou, ‘Decommissioning Status at CIAE and Proposes for IDN’ China Institute of Atomic Energy CIEA, Beijing 
<https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/documents/IDN_2007/China.pdf > accessed 17 January 2018.  
67 H.Yang, J. L., Clarke, & J. R. Thompson, ‘Nuclear energy: Improve collaboration’ (2016) 353(6304) Science, 1107-1107. 
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In September 2017, China’s National People’s Congress passed a new Nuclear 
Safety Law68. The new law will take effect in January 2018 and aim to enhance the 
safe use of nuclear energy, liability in the form of compensation for nuclear damage, 
public participation and international cooperation69. 
The new Nuclear Safety Law is a milestone in China’s nuclear development 
history. Before that, China only promulgated the Prevention and Control of 
Radioactive Pollution Law and other administrative regulations, which focused rather 
narrowly on the prevention and control of radioactive pollution70. 
 The new law lays out a comprehensive framework for nuclear safety and in 
totality include 8 sections71 and 94 provisions. This newly-published law is expected 
to have significant impacts on decommissioning practices and the nuclear sector at 
large  
 
3.2.1. Regulatory body reform 
 
The Nuclear Safety Law in principle maintains the administration system 
established by the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution Law and the other 
administrative standards72. It systematically consolidates requirements which were 
previously scattered across administrative regulations and ministerial decrees into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Y. Wu, ‘Public acceptance of constructing coastal/inland nuclear power plants in post-Fukushima China’ (2017) 101 Energy 
Policy, 484-491. 
69 F. Yuan, ‘Discussion About Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment in China’s Nuclear Power Plant Project’ 
(2017) 25th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (V008T12A012-V008T12A012). American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers. 
70	  R. Mu, J. Zuo, & X. Yuan, ‘China's approach to nuclear safety—From the perspective of policy and institutional system’ 
(2015) 76 Energy Policy, 161-172. 
71 1) General principles; 2) Safety of nuclear materials and waste; 3) Nuclear accident emergency response; 4) Public 
participation and information disclosure; 5) Administrative supervision and safety inspection; 6) Legal liabilities of nuclear 
damages, 7) Administrative liabilities of nuclear safety, and 8) Miscellaneous 
72 Z. Ming, L.Yingxin, , O.Shaojie, S.Hui, & L. Chunxue, ‘Nuclear energy in the Post-Fukushima Era: Research on the 
developments of the Chinese and worldwide nuclear power industries’ (2016) 58 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
147-156. 
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law, and supplements and improves the current nuclear safety system (See Article 6).	  
Furthermore, the new legislation will grant further powers to China’s National 
Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA). Also, Article 54 requires that the State shall 
set up a coordination committee to respond to nuclear emergency accidents.  
 
3.2.2. Decommissioning plan and procedures 
 
	  
The regulatory authority, NNSA and the State Council list the specific 
documents which should be submitted by the decommissioning operator73. These 
documents must prove that the whole decommissioning process will operate safely74. 
Upon the decommissioning of a nuclear facility, the governmental 
environmental protection department of the province, autonomous region or 
municipality where the nuclear facility is located shall organize the monitoring of the 
type and concentration of radionuclide at the site of the nuclear facility and in the 
environment surrounding it. 
 
3.2.3. Nuclear safety and radioactive waste management 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Article 30 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law: “Before a nuclear facility is decommissioned, the nuclear facility operating entity 
shall apply for decommissioning to the nuclear safety supervision and administration department of the State Council and submit 
the following documents: 
(1) An application for the decommissioning of the nuclear facility.     
(2) A safety analysis report.     
(3) An environmental impact assessment report.    
(4) Quality assurance documents.    
(5) Other documents required by the laws and administrative regulations.” 
74 Article 29 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law: “When a nuclear facility ceases to operate, the nuclear facility operating entity shall 
manage the shutdown by safe means to ensure safety during the shutdown and guarantee the basic functions, technical personnel 
and documents required by decommissioning.”    	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Chinese governmental officials have repeatedly claimed that China’s nuclear 
sector has not experienced a single major accident or serious radiation incident in the 
25 years since it connected its first reactor to the grid, making it far safer than coal75. 
Despite this, The International Atomic Energy Agency released a report on China’s 
nuclear safety last year claiming that China’s nuclear safety record had been strong 
but needed “further work” in areas such as waste management and handling ageing 
plants76. 
The Nuclear Safety Law mainly regulates the possession of nuclear material, 
processing, storage and disposal of radioactive waste, safety management of spent 
fuel, and transportation of nuclear material and radioactive waste77. Of these, the new 
additions are the license for processing radioactive waste and the safety management 
of spent fuel78.  
It is the first time that the Chinese legislator explicitly makes provision for 
safety management liability and disposal costs of spent fuel in the nuclear power 
sector79. Article 90 of the Nuclear Safety Law clearly lists both nuclear operators’ and 
suppliers’ liabilities to compensate for damages caused in the event of nuclear 
accidents. 
 
3.2.4. Public participation and information disclosure 
 
 
To the nuclear industry, information disclosure and public participation are 
pivotal for ensuring that the industry develops in a healthy manner and acts to de facto 	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  S. Zhou, & X. Zhang, ‘Nuclear energy development in China: a study of opportunities and challenges’ (2010) 35(11) Energy, 
4282-4288. 
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  IAEA PRIS, PRC China	  <https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=CN>	  
77 Article 39 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law. 
78 Article 43 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law. 
79 W. Geng, Z. Ming, P. Lilin, L. Ximei, , L. Bo, , & D. Jinhui, ‘China׳ s new energy development: Status, constraints and 
reforms’ (2016) 53 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 885-896. 
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strengthen a culture of nuclear safety. The new law clarifies the roles of central 
government, local governments and nuclear operators, and requires them to jointly 
improve information disclosure and public participation. 
Under the Nuclear Safety Law, all the relevant governmental departments 
shall disclose readily available information regarding nuclear safety, supervision 
reports, radioactive environmental quality, and nuclear accidents80. Nuclear operators 
should publish their annual nuclear safety reports, including information on their 
nuclear safety management system, radiation monitoring data and environmental 
assessments81.  
All such information shall be disclosed in a timely manner through official 
statements, online publications or any other means available to facilitate citizens’ 
access to information. In addition, citizens, enterprises or any other organizations, 
such as NGOs and international organizations, may apply to the relevant 
governmental agencies for access to the information stated above82. 
Regarding public participation, nuclear operators and the local governments of 
the nuclear unit locale shall solicit stakeholders’ opinions on main nuclear safety 
issues and shall facilitate public interest through public hearings, discussion forums, 
or any other effective means which permits for the meaningful deliverance and 
integration of feedback83. This new system is expected to encourage Chinese citizens 
to participate in nuclear industry development.  A focus on information disclosure and 
public participation, allows for knowledge of and contribution to nuclear procedure 
and substance, thereby enabling transparency which may eventually enhance public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Article 55 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law. 
81 Article 56 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law. 
82 Article 57 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law. 
83 Article 58 of China’s Nuclear Safety Law. 
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acceptance of nuclear energy in China. This important step highlights China’s newly 
invigorated determination to develop the nuclear sector, albeit in a sustainable way84. 
In addition, information disclosure and public participation measures can equally 
apply to decommissioning procedures as well.  
 
3.3 China may take the lead in international cooperation	  	  
The introduction of the Nuclear Safety Law is timely as China has now been 
developing its nuclear sector for over three decades. This new law has established a 
more comprehensive governance system for the industry and connected the country 
more closely with the international nuclear market.   
Today the Chinese nuclear industry is also faced with challenges in going 
global, as nuclear power projects are capital intensive and are often affected by 
political issues in some overseas markets. Due to China’s international obligations 
under binding treaties, the new law also requires the government to enhance 
international cooperation mechanisms in nuclear safety affairs and prevent the threat 
of nuclear terrorism.    
East Asia will be the focus of nuclear power in the near future85. To strengthen 
regional cooperation, China, Japan, South Korea and other ASEAN countries have 
launched a large-scale regional nuclear power development scheme. In 2011, China, 
Japan, and South Korea signed a “China-Japan-South Korea Nuclear Security 
Cooperative Initiative”. Based on this initiative, all three parties must establish 
cooperative frameworks and take action for achieving regional nuclear safety. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Chong	  Liu, ‘Pressing global nuclear security problems and China’s response’(2017) NAPSNet Special Reports, October 2017 
<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/pressing-global-nuclear-security-problems-and-chinas-response/> accessed 
17 January 2018.	  
85 ibid. 
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ASEAN also established a similar multilateral agreement in the region, namely the 
ASEAN Nuclear Safety Regulatory Cooperation Network (ASEANTOM)86. 
Furthermore, China and Taiwan entered into a bilateral Nuclear Power Safety 
Agreement in 201187. This cross-strait cooperative mechanism was designed to for 
the sharing of information, monitoring of nuclear safety, and safeguarding public 
health and the environment. Besides this agreement with China, Taiwan has been 
trying to cooperate with Japan and Korea and to join the ASEAN regional initiative 
especially through the APEC platform88.    
At the individual company level, some UK firms have provided their expertise 
and experiences to assist Chinese operators with nuclear decommissioning and waste 
management89. The collaboration between Atkin and Taihai as well as the one 
between James Fisher Nuclear and the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) 
are both good examples90. The CNNC was set up in 1988, succeeding the Chinese 
Ministry of Nuclear Industry. The main responsibility of the CNNC is to regulate the 
nuclear generators, manufacturers, civil and military research institutes. In addition to 
building large nuclear power units, the CNNC also owns and operates almost all the 
decommissioning facilities and waste management operations in China, including a 
reprocessing plant and a geological repository for nuclear waste. This provided both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 ibid. 
87	  Chen (n. 26). 
88	  ibid. 
89 ‘UK firm to assist Chinese with nuclear decommissioning’(2016) Nuclear Matters <http://nuclearmatters.co.uk/2016/09/uk-
firm-to-assist-chinese-with-nuclear-decommissioning/> accessed by 26 December 2017. 
90 Previous MOU and Agreement on Co-operation for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy were signed between China and Brazil in 
1984. See also Elaine Li, ‘James Fisher Nuclear introduces China in the UK decommissioning market’ (2016) NBN Media 
<https://nbn.media/james-fisher-nuclear-introduces-china-uk-decommissioning-market/> accessed by 26 December 2017. 
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policy and commercial opportunities for the world’s leading enterprises in nuclear 
decommissioning and waste management.  
Based on the current East Asian regional structure of co-operation and the 
rapid growth of China’s nuclear sector, China might consider taking the lead in 
regional and international nuclear cooperation. This will also be beneficial to China’s 
nuclear decommissioning sector and performance.   
In 2017, China and Brazil also signed their third Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) regarding nuclear cooperation91. This agreement is made 
between the CNNC and Brazil’s Electronuclear. It aims at deepening bilateral 
cooperation in achieving nuclear safety and highlights the common interests in 
completing the construction of Brazil’s Angra 3 nuclear power plant. Since Brazil and 
China are not geographically proximate, the geopolitical reasons behind this 
collaboration are worth exploring92. 
Besides sharing a common nuclear power plant decommissioning regulatory 
momentum, Brazil’s and China’s asymmetric capacities can be reciprocally 
combined: China’s policy to ‘go global’ through exporting nuclear technology 
including heavy components in the supply chain perfectly accommodates Brazil’s 
needs of an investor for the completion of its third nuclear reactor, currently under 
construction, and future nuclear power plants projects. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91  ‘Brazil and China sign new nuclear power cooperation agreement’ (2017) Macauhub <	  
https://macauhub.com.mo/2017/08/30/pt-brasil-e-china-assinam-novo-acordo-de-cooperacao-na-energia-nuclear/> accessed 16 
December 2017. 
92 Russia is also interest in completing Angra 3 However, China is expected to have an advantage in terms of financial resources. 
China and Russia are both part of the “nuclear club” and they have been recently competing against each other as exporters of 
nuclear energy technology to developing countries. See A Abdenur and C Kassier. ‘Nuclear Energy and the BRICS’ (2014) 15 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 55-66.  
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4. Discussion - The evolution of decommissioning regulation 
 
Looking at the regulatory frameworks in the selected advanced jurisdictions of 
US, UK and Japan, all of them have established detailed guidelines and regulations, 
paying attention to relevant aspects of nuclear decommissioning. Following these 
standards operating procedures, decommissioning operators can complete the process 
step-by-step. Moreover, these advanced jurisdictions usually have independent and 
efficient regulators for overseeing nuclear decommissioning operations. 
For safety purposes, the state-of-the-art technology for decommissioning 
nuclear reactors adopted worldwide is considered to be adequate. However, there are 
opportunities for further enhancement, especially with regards to minimizing human 
intervention, increasing efficiency and improving waste treatment93, as shown by the 
current efforts of the advanced jurisdictions of the UK and Japan, and of the US 
(primarily in the recent past). Although technological innovations are not always seen 
as a commercial advantage94, they represent invaluable gains for the safety and 
governance of nuclear activities,.  
Nevertheless, nuclear decommissioning is not only a scientific and 
technological issue. The process requires well-designed regulations and guidelines to 
consolidate its implementation. The form and content of decommissioning regulations 
have important practical implications and play a major role in promoting or, 
conversely, preventing social change.   
In addition, it is noted that nuclear decommissioning processes also encounter 
an array of social and environment challenges and conflicts, most notably in relation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 IAEA, Innovative and Adaptive Technologies in Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (IAEA, 2008), 2 
94 ibid, 1. 
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to waste management. The introduction of the waste management aspects of treatment, 
storage, transportation and disposal during site clean-up in the decommissioning rules, 
worldwide, is not without reason. Decommissioning is integral to and inseparable 
from waste management due to the fact that decommissioning entails the ultimate 
disposal of remaining waste whilst waste management represents an average of 60% 
of total decommissioning costs95. 
This raises the issue of public acceptance and trust. The public’s non-
acceptance is rooted in lack of information and knowledge, fear of risks, low level of 
public participation, and the well-known NIMBY syndrome. The literature also 
elucidates how this public non-acceptance and the bad personnel transition can do 
harm to the smooth progression of nuclear decommissioning. Sometimes serious 
social challenges can eventually cause the abandonment of decommissioning 
projects96. Therefore, effective information disclosure procedures and well-designed 
public engagement mechanisms are both key factors to democratizing nuclear 
decommissioning and enhancing the transparency and legitimacy of this process.  
The discussions above can be summarized by three policy components – 
technology, governance, and democracy – based on the elements distilled from 
observations on the advanced jurisdictions. Though it is a relatively structural and 
static perspective, this decommissioning policy approach is still useful in assessing 
the decommissioning regulations in various countries and their performances in 
practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 C Pescatore and T Eng, ‘Safe, Efficient and Cost-effective Decommissioning’ (2005) 23 (4) Nuclear Plant Journal, 62.  
96 M. Laraia, (Ed.) Nuclear decommissioning: Planning, execution and international experience, (Elsevier, 2012). See also D. C. 
Invernizzi, G.Locatelli & N.J. Brookes, ‘Managing social challenges in the nuclear decommissioning industry: a responsible 
approach towards better performance (2017) 35 (7) International Journal of Project Management, 1350-1364. 
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Brazil recently established a decommissioning nuclear power plant framework 
with clear and detailed provisions, addressing explicitly the close ties 
decommissioning holds with waste management, environment, public participation 
and technological innovation. Although individually the regulation is not sufficient to 
guarantee the highest safety standards, it is certainly a meaningful first step.	  
An analysis of the Brazilian decommissioning framework in contextual 
actuality reveals some governance shortcomings which are not demonstrable through 
a purely legalistic and formal revision of the relevant texts. For example, the CNEN 
as regulator operates in a dual capacity, carrying out the functions related to both the 
establishment of standards and the monitoring of nuclear operations and waste 
management, which could potentially represent a conflicts of interests. Ultimately, if 
the regulator’s monitoring function lacks rigour in following the plan approved by 
itself, the safety of decommissioning activities could be at risk.  
Also, at the implementation level of decommissioning rules, three further 
shortcomings can be envisaged. Firstly, as mentioned before, the public’s 
participation is part of the CNEN legislation process and of the EIA. However, the 
local communities in the vicinity of nuclear or waste management facilities are not 
necessarily aware of the risks, since the technical and scientific language of the 
documents could prove to be unreachable fora lay audience, thereby rendering it 
unimpeachable. In addition, public participation could be deemed a mere formality as 
it is very unlikely that the eventual local population’s contributions would actually 
influence the law-making or decommissioning process, unless is the contributions are 
backed by economic groups’ interests or the pressure of an expressive percentage of 
the population. 
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 Waste management could also be viewed as an obstacle during the 
decommissioning of Brazilian nuclear power plants, since Brazil does not have a 
permanent waste disposal site. The government intends to seek bids from 
municipalities, a decision-making process which will require the ground work of 
communication between stakeholders involved such as local inhabitants, political 
authorities, non-governmental organizations and experts.  
A final obstacle for the successful implementation of the decommissioning 
policy in Brazil is exogenous to domestic policies. As evidenced by the lack of funds 
to conclude Angra 3, it is possible that Brazil will face similar problems in applying 
state-of-the art techonology to the decommissioning of national nuclear power plants. 
As mentioned previously, technological innovations are key drivers for public 
participation and to the promotion of nuclear energy governance. In this instance, 
Brazil can benefit from further cooperation on nuclear technologies, such as the one 
recently discussed with China.  
In the case of China, an imbalance subsists in the decommissioning policy 
approach. Although the Nuclear Safety Act 2018 has been passed, there are still 
several problems. Many countries have established independent nuclear safety 
regulatory agencies, which are subject to Congress, the President or the direct 
leadership of the Cabinet, whilst maintaining sufficient independence and authority. 
Currently, China still lacks an independent regulatory authority for nuclear 
decommissioning. The functions of the current relevant authorities overseeing nuclear 
decommissioning to some extent overlap, whilst the departments themselves do not 
coordinate in an efficient way. Some additional problems are the following: (i) many 
provisions in the new Nuclear Safety Law are still too vague and require other 
administrative regulations to support them. This feature makes the law unclear and the 
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outcomes of its implementation can be inconsistent, especially for foreign investors; 
(ii) Article 4 of the Nuclear Safety Law states the general principles of 
decommissioning. However, both public participation and information disclosure 
have not been officially listed as general principles for guiding nuclear 
decommissioning projects in China, though other Articles mention and improve the 
current mechanisms; (iii) China’s current decommissioning personnel and budgets are 
still below the average standard globally97; and (iv) the basic law – Atomic Energy 
Law – for managing the whole nuclear sector and industries is not in force and there is 
no exact date for the passing of this law98, a significant piece of legislation which can 
integrate the current fragmented legal frameworks and enhance the national nuclear 
damage liability system.  
From a dynamic point of view, the evolution of decommissioning law and 
international governance mechanisms are driven by two major active factors, namely 
technology and democracy. So far, governments have mainly relied on nuclear 
technologists to establish those “top-down” models for decommissioning nuclear 
units. We can call this model the “technology-driven model”. For example, in China's 
nuclear safety law, such a development pattern can still be observed. In the future, 
civil society groups and the local communities will play a greater role in the 
emergence of a new generation of nuclear energy law and its enforcement, both at the 
domestic and international levels. This can be recognized as what we can dub “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 In the US, Japan and France, the average number of staff / per reactor reaches 33.5, and the average budget per reactor for the 
purposes of decommissioning reaches USD 8,260,000. In China, the average staff number per reactor is only 8.3, and the average 
budget per reactor is only USD 402,200. These numbers clearly present the capacities and challenges for implementing projects 
in China. 
98 According to the Chinese Plan for Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control during the Period of the 
Thirteenth Five-year Plan and the Vision for 2025, approved by the State Council in February 2017, China is still pushing 
forward the enactment of the Atomic Energy Law.  
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society-driven model”. This is not only an observation drawn from the experience of 
the countries in the field of decommissioning but also reflective of the content of 
international treaties regarding nuclear energy security. 
To sum up, both technology and democracy jointly promote the evolution of 
nuclear decommissioning law and a global governance framework. As the mainstream 
model evolves from the technology-driven one to a new society-driven model, it will 
truly place the people and local communities in the center of the decommissioning 
process. To some extent, this trend echoes the key concept of energy justice, which 
aims to apply justice principles to all aspects of energy policy, such as energy 
production, consumption, energy security and environmental protection99. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 In order to assess Brazil’s and China’s further development of their 
decommissioning frameworks and practices, this work has developed an structural 
perspective shaped by the experienced advanced jurisdictions such as the UK, US and 
Japan, and composed by the elements of technological innovation, public participation 
and governance. 
In summary, technological innovations in the nuclear sector can benefit 
humans and the environment, which could be sufficient in constructing an improved 
public opinion on nuclear activities. Thinking about (i) technological innovation, (ii) 
public participation and (iii) nuclear energy governance as three separate engines 
working in synergy, one can imagine that an increased rate of acceleration for each 
ultimately leads to the speedier achievement of goals each one of them represents.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Heffron and McCauley (n 1).  
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If envisaged as a virtuous cycle, technological innovation can act as an engine 
that will trigger more public participation and engagement whilst encouraging the 
establishment of the respective legal regime. In turn, the public participation engine 
will propel nuclear energy governance to move towards a comprehensive, democratic, 
safe and effective legal regime.  
Brazil and China have just started to build their national decommissioning 
nuclear power plant regimes. Some challenges faced by both countries are common, 
such as the need to strengthen their institutional regulatory bodies and to engage the 
population in all stages of the decommissioning processes, starting with the design of 
their own regulation. As per the technological aspect, Brazil’s and China’s pathways 
can cross to create a mutually beneficial relationship, in which China would act as a 
provider of nuclear energy technology to fulfill Brazil’s energy expansion needs. 
 
